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Abstract: The potential for advances in information-age technologies to undermine nuclear 
deterrence and influence the potential for nuclear escalation represents a critical question for 
international politics. One challenge is that uncertainty about the trajectory of technologies such 
as autonomous systems and artificial intelligence (AI) makes assessments difficult. This paper 
evaluates the relative impact of autonomous systems and artificial intelligence in three areas: 
nuclear command and control, nuclear delivery platforms and vehicles, and conventional 
applications of autonomous systems with consequences for nuclear stability. We argue that 
countries may be more likely to use risky forms of autonomy when they fear that their second-
strike capabilities will be undermined. Additionally, the potential deployment of uninhabited, 
autonomous nuclear delivery platforms and vehicles could raise the prospect for accidents and 
miscalculation. Conventional military applications of autonomous systems could simultaneously 
influence nuclear force postures and first-strike stability in previously unanticipated ways. In 
particular, the need to fight at machine speed and the cognitive risk introduced by automation 
bias could increase the risk of unintended escalation. Finally, used properly, there should be 
many applications of more autonomous systems in nuclear operations that can increase 
reliability, reduce the risk of accidents, and buy more time for decision-makers in a crisis.   
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Introduction 
 
Nuclear weapons are arguably the single most significant weapon system invented in modern 
history, meaning uncertainty about the viability of nuclear deterrence in the 21st century 
constitutes one of the most important security risks facing the world.2 This uncertainty is both a 
product and source of increased tensions in nuclear dyads worldwide. 
 
The proliferation of conventional military technologies, such as hypersonic weapons, could 
further undermine deterrence by potentially undermining traditional modes of escalation 
management, and as a consequence, nuclear stability.3 The impact of autonomous systems and 
artificial intelligence (AI) for nuclear stability remains understudied, however.4  
 
In early 2017, Klaus Schwab of the World Economic Forum argued that the world is on the cusp 
of a Fourth Industrial Revolution, wherein several technologies – but most prominently AI – 
could reshape global affairs.5 Many defense experts around the world share Schwab’s 
recognition of the potentially transformative effects of AI.6 The most prominent statements about 
the impact of AI on warfare, however, tend to be extreme. Elon Musk, for instance, has vocally 
contended that AI run amok could risk World War III.7 This overheated rhetoric masks the way 
that advances in automation, autonomous systems, and AI may actually influence warfare, 
especially in the vital areas of nuclear deterrence and warfighting. The intersection of nuclear 
stability and artificial intelligence thus raises critical issues for the study of international politics. 
 
                                                 
2 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution : Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1989). 
3 Keir A Lieber and Daryl G Press, "The New Era of Counterforce: Technological Change and the Future of Nuclear 
Deterrence," International Security 41, no. 4 (2017): 9-49; Charles L Glaser and Steve Fetter, "Should the United 
States Reject Mad? Damage Limitation and Us Nuclear Strategy toward China," International Security 41, no. 1 
(2016): 49-98; Austin Long and Brendan Rittenhouse Green, "Stalking the Secure Second Strike: Intelligence, 
Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy," Journal of Strategic Studies 38, no. 1-2 (2015): 38-73. Also see Brendan 
Rittenhouse Green et al, "The Limits of Damage Limitation," International Security 42, no. 1 (2017): 193-207. 
4 For exceptions, see Edward Geist and Andrew J. Lohn, “How Might Artificial Intelligence Affect the Risk of 
Nuclear War,” RAND Corporation, 2018, https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PE296.html; Vincent Boulanin 
and Maaike Verbruggen, “Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems,” Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, November 2017, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2017/other-publications/mapping-
development-autonomy-weapon-systems; Technology for Global Security, “Artificial Intelligence and the Military: 
Forever Altering Strategic Stability,” T4GS Report, February 13, 2019, 
https://www.tech4gs.org/uploads/1/1/1/5/111521085/ai_and_the_military_forever_altering_strategic_stability__t4gs
_research_paper.pdf.  
5 Klaus Schwab, The Fourth Industrial Revolution (New York: Crown Business, 2017). 
6 For examples, see Paul Scharre, Army of None (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2018); Michael C. 
Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence, International Competition, and the Balance of Power,” Texas National Security 
Review, vol. 3, no 1. (2018), pp. 38-57; Peter Asaro, “Why the World Needs to Regulate Autonomous Weapons, and 
Soon,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, April 27, 2018, https://thebulletin.org/2018/04/why-the-world-needs-to-
regulate-autonomous-weapons-and-soon/; Heather M. Roff and Richard Moyes. (2016). “Meaningful human 
control, artificial intelligence and autonomous weapons,” in Briefing Paper Prepared for the Informal Meeting of 
Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, UN Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons,  
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/MHC-AI-and-AWS-FINAL.pdf.   
7 Seth Fiegerman, "Elon Musk Predicts World War III," Cnn.com, September 4 2017, 
http://money.cnn.com/2017/2009/2004/technology/culture/elon-musk-ai-world-war/index.html.  
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Relative peace between nuclear-armed states in the 20th century arguably relied in part on 
mutually assured destruction (MAD).8 MAD prevails when each side recognizes that both it and 
its opponent have an assured nuclear second-strike capability, or that either side can impose 
unacceptable damage on the other in retaliation against a nuclear attack.9 Threat of mutual 
destruction ultimately led both the United States and the Soviet Union to deprioritize the role of 
preemption in their nuclear war plans.10  
 
Furthermore, as Albert Wohlstetter found, the threat of mutual destruction “offer[ed] every 
inducement to both powers to reduce the chance of accidental war.”11 While there are no known 
instances of accidental war, there are historical examples of unintended escalation, either in pre-
conflict crises or once a conflict is underway.12 Accidental escalation is when a state 
unintentionally commits an escalatory act (i.e. due to technical malfunction, human error, or 
incomplete control over military forces).13 Inadvertent escalation can also occur, whereby a state 
unknowingly commits an escalatory act (i.e., an intentional act that unknowingly crossing an 
adversary’s red line).14 Accidents have increased tensions between countries on numerous 
occasions, but have not led to escalation.15 Nuclear-armed states have expended vast resources to 
minimize the risk of unintentional escalation, knowing that it could lead to catastrophe should it 
occur. 
 
Automation may complicate the risks of escalation, deliberate or unintended, in a number of 
ways. Automation has improved safety and reliability in other settings, from nuclear power 
plants to commercial airliners. Used properly, many applications of automation in nuclear 
                                                 
8 “Nuclear stability” is a subcomponent of the broader concept of “strategic stability.” For a history of both, see 
Elbridge A. Colby and Michael S. Gerson, eds, Strategic Stability: Contending Interpretations (Carlisle Barracks, 
P.A.: Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College, February 2013).  
9 As Thomas Schelling wrote, “The balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy the other’s 
ability to strike back.” Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, M.A.: Harvard University Press, 
1960), 232. See also Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, C.T.: Yale University Press, 1966), 
228-229.  
10 Alexander Velez-Green, “The Unsettling View from Moscow: Russia’s Strategic Debate on a Doctrine of 
Preemption” (Center for a New American Security, April 2017). Technology for Global Stability, “Artificial 
Intelligence and the Military: Forever Altering Strategic Stability,” 
https://www.tech4gs.org/uploads/1/1/1/5/111521085/ai_and_the_military_forever_altering_strategic_stability__t4gs
_research_paper.pdf.. 
11 Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs (January 1959); and Albert Wohlstetter, 
The Delicate Balance of Terror, P-1472 (RAND Corporation, December 1958).   
12 Forrest E. Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (RAND Corporation, 
2008) 23-28. 
13 Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds, 25-28; and Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety : Organizations, Accidents, 
and Nuclear Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993). On the stability of crises to unintended 
escalation, see Dan Reiter, "Exploding the Powder Keg Myth: Preemptive Wars Almost Never Happen," 
International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1995), pp. 5-34. 
14 Kerry M. Kartchner and Michael S. Gerson, “Escalation to Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century,” in On 
Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, eds. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford, C.A.: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 150, 158. See also Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington, D.C, 
Brookings Institution Press, 1993); Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear 
Weapons (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); Barry R. Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional 
War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Morgan et al., Dangerous Thresholds, 23-25. 
15 Patricia Lewis et al., “Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy,” Chatham 
House Report, April 2014. 
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operations could increase reliability, reduce the risk of accidents, and buy more time for 
decision-makers in a crisis. Automation can help ensure that information is quickly processed, 
national leaders’ desires are swiftly and efficiently conveyed, and launch orders are faithfully 
executed.  
 
On the other hand, poor applications of automation could render nuclear early warning or 
command-and-control (C2) systems more opaque to users, leading to human-machine interaction 
failures. Human users could fall victim to automation bias, for example, surrendering their 
judgment to the system in a crisis.  
 
Automation is often brittle and lacks the flexibility humans have to react to events in their 
broader context. The states most likely to be willing to tolerate these risks for the perceived 
capability gains would be those that have significant concerns about the viability of their second 
strike deterrents. Thus, the more a country fears that, in a world without using autonomous 
systems, its ability to retaliate to a nuclear strike would be at risk, the more attractive 
autonomous systems may appear. 
  
Uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms could undermine nuclear surety, as they could be hacked 
or slip out of control, potentially leading to accidental or inadvertent escalation. Automated 
systems could end up reducing decision-maker flexibility by narrowing options, hampering 
attempts to manage escalation. 
 
These dynamics suggest that autonomous systems could influence the potential for nuclear 
escalation in three ways. First, while many aspects of the nuclear enterprise are already 
automated in many countries, from early warning and command and control to missile targeting, 
as autonomous systems improve, states may elect to automate new portions of the early warning 
and C2 processes to improve both performance and security. From a security standpoint, for 
instance, increased automation in nuclear early warning may allow operators to identify threats 
more rapidly in a complex environment. Likewise, automation may help to ensure the 
dissemination of launch orders in a timely manner in a degraded communications environment. 
States may also automate – or threaten to automate – nuclear launch procedures in the belief that 
doing so would provide them with a coercive advantage over adversaries.  
 
Second, as military robotics advance, nuclear powers could deploy uninhabited nuclear delivery 
platforms for a variety of reasons. For instance, a state might deploy nuclear-armed long-
endurance uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the belief that doing so would provide 
additional nuclear signaling or strike options. They might also look to uninhabited nuclear 
delivery platforms to bolster their secure second-strike capabilities. Nuclear delivery vehicles – 
such as torpedoes – capable of autonomously countering enemy defenses or selecting targets 
might be seen to do likewise. Alternatively, a government might choose to automate its nuclear 
forces so that a small number of trusted agents can maintain control. This might could be 
especially attractive for a nuclear-armed regime that fears a coup or other forms of interference 
by its nation’s military elite.   
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Third, the increased automation of conventional military systems might influence nuclear 
stability in direct and indirect ways.16 It may enable – or more likely yet, be seen to enable – 
improved counterforce operations by technologically-advanced states. The ineffectiveness of 
counterforce operations – and hence the survivability of second-strike deterrents – presently 
hinges in large part on the difficulty of finding and tracking adversary nuclear launch platforms 
(mobile missiles or submarines) long enough for ordnance to be delivered. Machine learning 
algorithms and other applications of artificial intelligence could, in principle, improve states’ 
abilities to collect and sift through large amounts of data in order to locate and track such targets, 
though it is important to recognize limitations to any developments given the real-time 
requirements for a disarming strike. Likewise, military autonomy could enable the deployment of 
conventional autonomous systems designed to shadow and/or attack nuclear-armed submarines. 
Furthermore, if automation gives (or is perceived to give) one side in a competitive dyad a 
significant conventional military advantage, the weaker side may feel compelled to rely more 
heavily on nuclear weapons for deterrence and warfighting.  
 
These issues surrounding the potential impacts of artificial intelligence are magnified by 
uncertainty about the trajectory of technological developments. This article first proceeds by 
clarifying what autonomous systems are and clarifying often-tricky definitional issues 
surrounding artificial intelligence. It then lays out some key theoretical expectations. Second, the 
article explores the impact of autonomous systems on early warning and nuclear command and 
control, as well as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) relevant for nuclear 
systems, in the context of recent research. Third, the article discusses the potential for 
uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms and vehicles featuring new kinds of automation. Fourth, 
the article describes the way conventional autonomous systems could both directly and indirectly 
influence nuclear stability. Finally, the article concludes by assessing the net likely impact of 
autonomous systems on nuclear stability and describing potential pathways for future research. 
The analysis argues that the impact of autonomous systems could depend on the specific 
application – both where automation falls in the nuclear enterprise but also how it is 
implemented in terms of design, human-machine interfaces, training, and operator culture. 
 
Autonomous Systems and Artificial Intelligence 
 
The field of artificial intelligence, which dates back to the 1950s, has seen tremendous growth in 
recent years. Much of these recent gains have come from “deep learning,” a machine learning 
technique that uses deep (multi-layer) neural networks.  
 
Deep learning is relatively new and, while a powerful technique, has certain insecurities. Deep 
neural networks are vulnerable to a form of spoofing attack that uses adversarial data to fool the 
network into misidentifying false data with high confidence.17 This vulnerability is prevalent 
                                                 
16 Paul Scharre and Michael C. Horowitz, "An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems," CNAS Working 
Paper, February 2015, http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-
pdf/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v021002.pdf. 
17 Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy, "Explaining and Harnessing Adversarial Examples," 
arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572  (2014); Anh Nguyen, Jason Yosinski, and Jeff Clune, "Deep Neural Networks Are 
Easily Fooled: High Confidence Predictions for Unrecognizable Images" (paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2015); Christian Szegedy et al, "Intriguing 
Properties of Neural Networks," arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199  (2013).  
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across neural networks in wide use today. While adversarial training can somewhat mitigate 
these risks, there is currently no known solution to this vulnerability.18 Additionally, machine 
learning is vulnerable to “data poisoning” techniques that manipulate the data used to train a 
machine learning system, thus causing it to learn the wrong thing. Finally, artificial intelligence 
systems today, including those that do not use deep learning, have a set of safety challenges 
broadly referred to as “the control problem.”19 Under certain conditions, for example, artificial 
intelligence tools can learn in unexpected and counterintuitive ways that may not be consistent 
with their users or designer’s intent.20  
 
These machine learning tools are powerful and are being used in novel experimental 
applications.21 But, given these vulnerabilities, they are not sufficiently mature to operate 
independent of human control for high-risk tasks, such as nuclear operations. These 
vulnerabilities are fairly well-understood in AI circles and among technical experts within the 
U.S. defense community.22 As a result, while AI and machine learning tools are already being 
incorporated into a variety of commercial applications,23 it seems unlikely that risk-averse 
government bureaucracies will be at the forefront of adoption, particularly for high-risk 
applications such as nuclear operations.  
 
However, older “first wave” AI systems that employ rule-based decision-making logic have been 
used in automated and autonomous systems for decades, including in nuclear operations.24 These 
expert AI systems use handcrafted knowledge from humans to create a structured set of if-then 
rules to determine the appropriate action in a given setting. Automated systems of this type are 
widely used, including in high-consequence operations such as commercial airline autopilots and 
automation in nuclear power plant operations. Rule-based expert AI systems can often improve 
reliability and performance when used in predictable settings. However, because such systems 
can only follow the rules they’ve been given, they often perform poorly in novel situations or 
unpredictable environments.  
 
In this paper, unless otherwise specified, we generally use the terms automated or autonomous 
system to refer to “first wave” expert AI systems that perform various tasks on their own, 
                                                 
18 Ian Goodfellow, "Deep Learning Adversarial Examples Clarifying Misconceptions," KDnuggets, July 2015, 
http://www.kdnuggets.com/2015/2007/deep-learning-adversarial-examples-misconceptions.html.  
19 Dario Amodei et al, "Concrete Problems in Ai Safety," arXiv preprint arXiv:1606.06565  (2016).  
20 Amodei et al, “Concrete Problems in AI Safety;” Joel Lehman et al., “The Surprising Creativity of Digital 
Evolution,” August 14, 2018, https://arxiv.org/pdf/1803.03453.pdf.  
21 “AlphaGo,” https://deepmind.com/research/alphago/. Also see Mariusz Bojarski et al, "End to End Learning for 
Self-Driving Cars," arXiv preprint arXiv:1604.07316  (2016); Volodymyr Mnih et al, "Playing Atari with Deep 
Reinforcement Learning," arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.5602  (2013). 
22 JASON Study, "Perspectives on Research in Artificial Intelligence and Artificial General Intelligence Relevant to 
DoD," The MITRE Corporation, JSR-16-Task-003, January 2017, https://fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/ai-dod.pdf; 
U.S. Air Force Office of the Chief Scientist, "Autonomous Horizons: System Autonomy in the Air Force – a Path to 
the Future, Volume I: Human-Autonomy Teaming," AF/ST TR 15-01 June, 
https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=768107..   
23 “Watson,” https://www.ibm.com/watson/. H. James  Wilson, Paul  Daugherty, and Prashant  Shukla, "How One 
Clothing Company Blends Ai and Human Expertise," Harvard Business Review, November 21 2016, 
https://hbr.org/2016/2011/how-one-clothing-company-blends-ai-and-human-expertis. 
24 John Launchbury, “DARPA Perspective on AI,” Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 
https://www.darpa.mil/about-us/darpa-perspective-on-ai.  
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sometimes under human supervision (supervised autonomy) and sometimes absent human 
supervision for a period of time (full autonomy).   
 
To Trust or Not to Trust: Autonomous Systems 
 
Automation has been used in high-risk applications for decades, in both civilian and military 
capacities. Nuclear power plants, commercial airlines, and private space ventures, for instance, 
all use automation to perform complex operations. Automation also serves niche roles in nuclear 
operations, including in early warning, targeting, launch control, delivery platforms, and delivery 
vehicles. Each of these applications, however, relies on mature technology and often retains 
human control over decision-making prior to the launch of the delivery vehicle. 
 
Questions about adopting autonomous systems require potential adopters to grapple with how to 
balance the risk that humans will not trust machines to operate effectively against the risk that 
humans will trust machines too much. Trust gaps occur when people do not trust machines to do 
the work of people, even if the machine outperforms humans in benchmark tasks. This can lead 
to an unwillingness to deploy or properly use systems. It can also lead to a preference for using 
human-controlled systems. Dietvorst, Simmons, and Massey show that when humans have to 
choose between using human forecasters or algorithms to make assessments about the future, 
they trust humans even when they can see an algorithm outperform humans.25 Moreover, when 
algorithms make mistakes, humans are faster to lose confidence in their effectiveness than when 
they see humans make mistakes. 
 
There is contested evidence that a trust gap exists when it comes to military remotely-piloted 
aircraft (i.e., drones). Surveying Ground Tactical Air Controllers (GTACs) about their preference 
for inhabited aircraft versus drones for close air support, Schneider and MacDonald find that 
GTACs tended to prefer inhabited aircraft. They argue that GTACs believed that pilots in 
inhabited aircraft had more “skin in the game” and were thus more likely to perform effectively 
(even though there was no evidence that that was the case).26 Their results are controversial – 
other military personnel argue that their trust gap findings do not reflect the reality on the 
ground, where military personnel are learning to trust remotely-piloted systems 27 Regardless of 
whether a trust gap exists in the GTAC community, the theoretical point has relevance for 
thinking about potential end users of autonomous systems. 
 
For applications of artificial intelligence, the alternative to a trust gap is automation bias. While 
humans are slow to trust information from a “machine,” such as data from radar, research 
demonstrates that once they believe in the effectiveness of the system, they become more willing 
to surrender judgment, even when there is evidence that the machine may be incorrect in a given 
situation. For example, in flight simulation experiments, participants given very good, but not 
                                                 
25 Berkeley J. Dietvorst, Joseph P. Simmons, and Cade Massey, “Algorithm Aversion: People Erroneously Avoid 
Algorithms After Seeing Them Err,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 144, no. 1 (2015): 114-126; 
Berkeley J. Dietvorst, Joseph P. Simmons, and Cade Massey, “Overcoming Algorithm Aversion: People will Use 
Imperfect Algorithms if they can (even slightly) modify them,” Management Science, 64, no. 3: 1155-1170. 
26 Jacquelyn Schneider and Julia MacDonald, “The Role of Risk in Battlefield Force Employment Decisions: An 
Analysis of Tactical Decisions to Use Unmanned versus Manned Weaponry,” Security Studies, forthcoming. 
27 Cory T. Anderson et al., “Trust, Troops, and Reapers: Getting ‘Drone Research’ Right,” War on the Rocks, April 
3, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/04/trust-troops-and-reapers-getting-drone-research-right/ 
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perfect, automated flight systems tend to make more mistakes. Participants became more likely 
to miss problems unless explicitly prompted by the autonomous system; they also tend to trust 
the autonomous system over their own judgment even when their training suggested the plane 
might be at risk (e.g. errors of both omission and commission).28  
 
Automation bias, whereby humans effectively surrender judgment to machines, therefore 
represents one important risk from automation. For example, Army investigators found that 
automation bias was a factor in the 2003 Patriot fratricides, in which Army Patriot air and missile 
defense operators shot down two friendly aircraft during the opening stages of the Iraq War. In 
both instances, humans were “in the loop” and retained final decision authority for firing, but 
operators nevertheless trusted the (incorrect) signals they were receiving from their automated 
radar systems.29 Army investigators found that automation bias was pervasive throughout the 
Patriot community at the time, which had a culture of “trusting the system without question.”30 
According to Army researchers, Patriot operators exhibited an “unwarranted and uncritical trust 
in automation. In essence, control responsibility [was] ceded to the machine.”31 
 
In addition to the problems of trust gap and automation bias, human-machine interaction failures 
can manifest in other ways. The opacity of complex machines can be a hurdle to operators fully 
understanding them, and this can lead to accidents. As systems increase in complexity, human 
users may not fully comprehend how automated systems will behave in response to certain 
inputs coming either from the environment or from human operators themselves.32 This 
complexity and breakdown in human-machine integration appears to have been a factor in the 
2016 fatal accident involving a Tesla car on autopilot33 and the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 
447, which killed everyone onboard.34 In both cases, the human users failed to understand how 
their respective automated systems would respond to their environments, leading them to take 
actions that, had they known otherwise, they would likely not have taken. A breakdown in 
                                                 
28 Linda J Skitka, Kathleen L Mosier, and Mark Burdick, "Does Automation Bias Decision-Making?," International 
Journal of Human-Computer Studies 51, no. 5 (1999): 991-1006; Mary L Cummings, "Automation Bias in 
Intelligent Time Critical Decision Support Systems" (paper presented at the AIAA 1st Intelligent Systems Technical 
Conference, 2004). 
29 John K. Hawley, "Patriot Wars: Automation and the Patriot Air and Missile Defense System," Center for a A New 
American Security, January 25 2017, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/patriot-wars; John K. Hawley, "Not 
by Widgets Alone: The Human Challenge of Technology-Intensive Military Systems," Armed Forces Journal 41 
(2011): 24-28; John K. Hawley, "Looking Back at 20 Years of Manprint on Patriot: Observations and Lessons," 
Army Research Laboratory, ARL-SR-0158, September 2007, http://www.arl.army.mil/arlreports/2007/ARL-SR-
0158.pdf. 
30 Hawley, "Looking Back at 20 Years of Manprint on Patriot."  
31 Hawley, "Not by Widgets Alone." Patriot operators now train on this and other similar scenarios to avoid this 
problem of unwarranted trust in the automation. 
32 Paul Scharre, "Autonomous Weapons and Operational Risk," CNAS Working Paper, February 2016, 
http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf. 
33 The Tesla Team, "A Tragic Loss," Tesla.com, June 30 2016, https://www.tesla.com/blog/tragic-loss; Anjali 
Singhvi and Karl Russell, "Inside the Self-Driving Tesla Fatal Accident," The New York Times, July 12 2016, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/2007/2001/business/inside-tesla-accident.html. 
34 The full, official accident report by French authorities is, “Final Report: On the accidents of 1st June 2009 to the 
Airbus A330-203 registered F-GZCP operated by Air France flight 447 Rio de Janeiro – Paris,” Bureau d'Enquêtes 
et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile, [English translation], 2012, http://www.bea.aero/docspa/2009/f-
cp090601.en/pdf/f-cp090601.en.pdf. 
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human-machine integration can have disastrous consequences even if human users retain manual 
control over the system, as they did in the case of the Air France 447 crash.  
 
Finally, automated systems can pose risks because of their complexity, tight-coupling, and 
ability to take actions at machine speed. Complex automated systems are generally powered by 
software, making them potentially vulnerable to bugs and hacking. As one example, a 2007 
software malfunction caused eight F-22 fighter jets to lose navigation, fuel subsystems, and some 
communications when they crossed the international dateline.35 Rigorous software testing can 
reduce error rates, but error-free software is not realistic outside of extremely narrow 
applications.36 Software vulnerabilities can also leave the door open for hackers. Security 
researchers have demonstrated the ability to remotely hack automobiles, for example, disabling 
or taking control of critical driving functions such as steering and brakes.37 Autonomous systems 
are also vulnerable to so-called “normal accidents” arising from the interaction of components of 
complex systems. While these risks are not unique to automation – normal accidents occur in 
manual systems38 – automation can increase the “tight coupling” between components. Tight 
coupling is a condition in which one action in a system directly causes another action with little 
“slack” in the system – time, visibility, and opportunity for human intervention to manage 
unanticipated events. Automation can increase the coupling between components and, moreover, 
accelerate the pace of actions to machine speed. The “brittleness” inherent to emerging forms of 
automation, along with omnipresent risk of automation bias, human-machine interaction failures, 
and unanticipated machine behavior, all potentially limit the roles that automation can safely fill. 
 
Risk, Reliability, and Safety 
 
There are many models for coping with these risks. One model is to eschew automation entirely, 
which forgoes its potential benefits. Another model is to retain humans either “in the loop” of 
automation, requiring positive human input, or “on the loop,” overseeing the system in a 
supervisory capacity. Human-machine teaming is no panacea for these risks. Even if automated 
systems have little “autonomy” and humans remain in control, the human users could fall victim 
to automation bias, leading them to cede judgment to the machine. Appropriately determining 
when to intervene is not sufficient to ensure safe operation. Human users may lack the ability to 
effectively intervene and take control if their skills have atrophied due to relying on automation 
or if they do not sufficiently understand the automation.39 Properly integrating humans and 
machines into effective and reliable joint cognitive systems that harness the advantages of each 
                                                 
35 Remarks by Air Force retired Major General Don Sheppard on “This Week at War,” CNN, February 24, 2007, 
http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0702/24/tww.01.html. 
36 Steve McConnell, Code Complete: A Practical Handbook of Software Construction (Redmond, WA: Microsoft 
Press, 1993). The space shuttle is an interesting exception. NASA drove errors to zero through a labor-intensive 
process employing teams of engineers. However, the space shuttle has only approximately 500,000 lines of code. 
The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, in contrast, has over 20 million lines of code. Charles Fishman, “They Write the Right 
Stuff,” FastCompany.com, December 31, 1996, http://www.fastcompany.com/28121/they-write-right-stuff.  
37 Andy Greenberg, “Hackers Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway – With Me in It,” Wired, July 21, 2015, 
http://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/. 
38 Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1984).. Also see 
“Eastern L-1011 in Florida: Accident Overview,” Federal Aviation Administration, 
http://lessonslearned.faa.gov/ll_main.cfm?TabID=3&LLID=8&LLTypeID=2#null.  
39 Konnikova, "The Hazards of Going on Autopilot; Stephen M Casner et al, "The Retention of Manual Flying Skills 
in the Automated Cockpit," Human factors 56, no. 8 (2014): 1506-1516. 
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requires proper design, testing, training, leadership, and culture, which is not straightforward to 
achieve.40 
 
Reliability and predictability are significant factors in determining whether automation is a net 
positive or negative in high-risk applications. Constructing reliable joint cognitive systems may 
be especially difficult for military organizations. Research suggests that organizations’ ability to 
accurately assess risks and deploy reliable systems depends as much, if not more, on bureaucratic 
and organizational factors as on technical ones.41 It is not sufficient for safe and reliable 
operation to be technically possible. Militaries must also be willing to pay the cost – in time, 
money, and operational effectiveness – of investing in safety. These are challenges for any high-
risk applications of automation, but nuclear operations pose certain unique challenges. The 
potentially cataclysmic consequences of nuclear war makes it difficult to estimate how safe is 
safe enough. 
 
Competition and Autonomous Systems 
 
A challenge to safety in military settings is that operations occur in a competitive environment. 
Unlike in other areas where safety is paramount, such as airline travel or nuclear power plant 
operations, in military settings, safety is balanced against operational effectiveness. For nuclear 
operations, this balancing is captured in the “always-never dilemma.”42 Nuclear organizations 
are expected to always be ready to launch a nuclear weapon at a moment’s notice and, at the 
same time, never allow unauthorized or accidental launch. As Scott Sagan points out, meeting 
both criteria is effectively “impossible.”43 
 
On one level, the obvious destructive potential of nuclear weapons naturally induces caution in 
military professionals and policymakers who may be considering whether or not to use 
automation in nuclear operations. In this sense, a strong organizational bias towards maintaining 
positive human control over nuclear weapons is likely to mitigate against any risks from adding 
automation. The track record of safety for nuclear operations might lead one to be less sanguine 
about the ability of bureaucracies to successfully manage the risks of automation, however.44 
                                                 
40 Hawley, "Patriot Wars." 
41 On automation and risks in military decision-making, see ibid; Hawley, "Not by Widgets Alone. On general 
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Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); 
Sagan, The Limits of Safety; Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War : Innovation and the Modern Military (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Dima Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural 
Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the Us, and Israel (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2010). On organizational reliability and accidents in general, see Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High Risk 
Systems; Karl E Weick and Kathleen M Sutcliffe, Managing the Unexpected: Resilient Performance in an Age of 
Uncertainty, vol. 8 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2011). 
42 Sagan, The Limits of Safety, 278  
43 Ibid.  
44 Sagan, The Limits of Safety : Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons; Patricia M Lewis et al, "Too Close 
for Comfort: Cases of near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy," Chatham House Report, April 2014, 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20140428TooCloseforComfortNuclea
rUseLewisWilliamsPelopidasAghlani.pdf. 
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Examples like the Soviet Perimeter system, discussed below, also demonstrate that some nations 
are likely to view the risks and benefits of automation differently from others. 
 
What might lead to variation in how countries make choices about the relative utility of 
autonomous systems? The answer could depend on how secure they feel about their non-
autonomous nuclear systems. States that feel extremely secure in their second strike capabilities 
at present may see fewer advantages to automation. In that case, the advantages greater speed 
and precision but might not appear worth the potential risk of accidents. Instead, states like the 
United States would likely prefer to use existing non-autonomous systems for nuclear command 
and control and delivery.  
 
In contrast, countries whose nuclear arsenals are more insecure may be more accepting of risk 
and may find the perceived advantages of automation more valuable. If a country thinks that its 
nuclear command and control might be at risk of severe degradation or destruction, it might be 
more likely to automate early warning to increase its response speed, deploy autonomous nuclear 
delivery platforms with higher endurance, automate new aspects of target selection for nuclear 
delivery vehicles, or shift towards more automated nuclear launch postures. All may not happen 
in unison, of course, but as a general relationship, countries whose arsenals are more insecure 
may be more willing to take risks to better enhance their arsenal’s survivability. 
 
Autonomous Systems and Nuclear Stability 
 
This section outlines the three areas described in the introduction of the article – nuclear early 
warning and command and control, nuclear delivery platforms and vehicles, and non-nuclear 
autonomous systems – and how they could influence nuclear stability, particularly in crisis 
situations. 
 
Automation in Early Warning and Nuclear Command and Control  
 
There are many places where automation is already used in early warning and nuclear command 
and control. Early warning systems rely heavily on automation to quickly warn human operators 
about potential inbound missiles.45 Command-and-control systems also have a number of 
automated functions, such as rapid retargeting or communication rockets to beam launch codes 
down to missile silos.46 Some forms of automation in early warning and nuclear command and 
control have been non-controversial. Others have generated significant controversy and have 
even been involved in near-accidents.   
 
Risk of Catastrophic Failure 
 
                                                 
45 Geoffrey Forden, Pavel Podvig, and Theodore A Postol, "False Alarm, Nuclear Danger," IEEE Spectrum 37, no. 3 
(2000): 31-39; Air Force Space Command, "Ballistic Missile Early Warning System," March 2017, 
http://www.afspc.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/1126401/ballistic-missile-early-warning-system; 
John Pike, "Russia and Early Warning Systems," GlobalSecurity.org, November 12 2016, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/warning.htm. 
46 Interview with Gen.-Col. (Ret.) Varfolomei Vladimirovich Korobushin, December 10, 1992, 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20II%20Korobushin.PDF; and Interview with Vitalii Leonidovich 
Kataev, May 1993, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb285/vol%20II%20Kataev.PDF. 
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The most famous automation-related near-accident is the 1983 Stanislav Petrov incident in which 
the Soviet Oko satellite-based early warning system registered a false alarm of five U.S. 
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launches. Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov was the 
watch officer on duty who was responsible for alerting Soviet leadership of a U.S. attack. Petrov 
has said that the automated alert system reported a missile strike with the “highest” confidence. 
Automated alerts included an audible siren and a large red backlit screen that flashed “launch” 
and “missile strike.” While these automated alerts serve the purpose of gaining human operators’ 
attention, they can also exacerbate the risk of automation bias. Petrov subsequently reported that 
he “had a funny feeling in my gut” and estimated the odds of the strike being real as 50/50.47 
Petrov did not fall victim to automation bias and reported a system malfunction to his superiors, 
rather than reporting a U.S. nuclear strike was underway. 
 
A related highly-controversial application of automation in NC2 is the use of “dead hand” 
systems that could launch a nuclear counterattack in the event that a nation’s leadership was 
wiped out by a surprise nuclear first strike. The concept of a dead hand “doomsday machine” 
was a plot point in Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film Dr. Strangelove, but there are reports that the 
Soviet Union may have built a semi-automated dead hand system called “Perimeter.” According 
to primary source interviews with former Soviet officers, the system was intended to be activated 
in a crisis48 as a “fail deadly” mechanism to ensure retaliation against the United States in the 
event of a successful U.S. first strike.  
 
Specific accounts of Perimeter’s functionality differ,49 but the essential concept was a network of 
light, radiation, seismic, and pressure sensors that could detect any nuclear detonations in Soviet 
territory.50 According to accounts of the system, if it was activated and it sensed a nuclear 
detonation, it would check for communications to the Soviet military General Staff.51 If there 
was no order to halt, after a pre-determined period of time ranging from on the order of 15 
minutes to an hour, the system would act like a “dead man’s switch” and transfer nuclear launch 
authority directly to human duty officers in an underground bunker. These individuals would 
then be tasked with launching communication rockets that would fly over Soviet territory, 
                                                 
47 Pavel Aksenov, “Stanislav Petrov: The man who may have saved the world,” BBC News, September 26, 2013, 
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50 Thompson, “Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine”; Interview with Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev; and 
Interview with Gen.-Col. (Ret.) Varfolomei Vladimirovich Korobushin. 
51 Ibid.  
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beaming down launch codes to hardened missile silos.52 A human would remain “in the loop” for 
the final decision to launch, but Perimeter would bypass normal layers of command and transfer 
authority directly to the watch officer on duty.53  
 
If the Soviets did indeed decide to develop and deploy a dead hand system, they did so without 
telling their American counterparts. This would appear, on the face of it, counterproductive. If 
the intent of a dead hand system was to enhance deterrence by ensuring an adversary that 
retaliation was certain, then keeping it a secret would appear to undermine the whole point of the 
system. According to reports from former Soviet officers, however, the point of Perimeter was 
not to change the decision-making calculus of U.S. leaders, but rather that of Soviet leadership 
themselves.54 A dead hand system was intended to take the pressure off of Soviet leaders to “use 
or lose” their nuclear weapons in the event of ambiguous warning of a U.S. surprise attack. The 
logic of the Soviet approach illustrates how differently countries may view the role of 
automation in nuclear command and control. These differences in perspective, in turn, may lead 
a nuclear-armed state to misestimate or misunderstand the risks an adversary is willing to run in 
order to fortify their nuclear deterrent, thereby increasing chances of accidental or inadvertent 
escalation.  
 
There are other examples of automation in NC2 systems. Bruce Blair has discussed how 
automation was used in the United States and Soviet nuclear enterprise. For example, Moscow 
used an “automated broadcast network”55 to deliver battle orders in the case of a crisis or a first 
strike. In the United States, the Strategic Air Command Control System came online in 1968 to 
transmit Emergency Action Messages to U.S. forces in the field in case of a crisis. While the 
system had to be operated by a person, once activated and initiated, the system offered the 
United States the ability to transmit the message even if, subsequent to activation, U.S. command 
centers were destroyed.56 
 
Russian missiles that were de-targeted following the end of the Cold War have been reportedly 
programmed to automatically revert to their wartime targets in the United States if launched 
without a flight plan. In the event of a deliberate decision by Russian leadership to launch, 
automation cut the time needed to re-target and launch all of their missiles to 10 seconds. 
Similarly, while U.S. missiles were reportedly set to targets in the middle of the ocean during 
peacetime, the entire U.S. missile arsenal could allegedly be retargeted in 10 seconds.57 The 
automation-enabled ability to rapidly retarget missiles undoubtedly was a factor in Russian and 
American leadership being comfortable with de-targeting their missiles. Even so, if a Russian 
missile set to automatically revert to wartime targets were launched accidentally or without 
                                                 
52 Interview with Vitalii Leonidovich Kataev; and Interview with Gen.-Col. (Ret.) Varfolomei Vladimirovich 
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authorization, it could spark nuclear war. Dead hand systems or rapid retargeting of a nation’s 
entire missile arsenal could thereby exacerbate the consequences of an accident or unauthorized 
use by making it easier for such events to automatically lead to catastrophe.  
 
In addition, automation of a state’s nuclear command-and-control systems could be used to 
enhance deterrence by effectively tying one’s hands, for instance, by communicating that any 
attack on a nation’s homeland defense systems would trigger nuclear escalation. That is, a 
nuclear-armed state could view an explicit threat of automated retaliation as useful for escalation 
management. Autonomous systems – in particular, the expanded automation of a state’s NC2 
apparatus – could be used to increase uncertainty on the part of all involved in a conflict as to 
what it would take to trigger nuclear launch. A nuclear-armed state that is sufficiently risk 
tolerant and is confronted by a conventionally superior adversary may use this uncertainty to 
limit the scale or scope (i.e. geographic or targeting) of an attack on its interests.  
 
Credibly communicating such a threat to an adversary might be challenging, however. Given that 
automation resides in software, its effects can be difficult to demonstrate prior to crisis or 
conflict.58 If a state were to use automation to tie its hands but could not show that it had done 
so, it would be like “tearing out the steering wheel” in a game of chicken but being unable to 
throw it out the window.59 The net effect of automation in this instance would be to reduce 
flexibility and increase crisis instability.  
 
Opportunity for Improved Reliability? 
 
These challenges with existing automation of nuclear command and control illustrate the way 
that automation can become a double-edged sword. Shortening the time and steps needed to 
launch nuclear weapons can help buy more time for decision-makers to weigh ambiguous 
information and make an informed judgment before acting. On the other hand, in the event of 
accidents or misuse, there may be fewer steps and consequently fewer safeguards in place. 
 
A critical question is thus how militaries will employ advances in AI to influence their early 
warning and NC2 systems. There may be many places where militaries could employ new forms 
of autonomous systems to bolster the reliability and effectiveness of early warning and NC2. 
Human-machine teaming could help offset automation bias and thus enable the use of more 
autonomous systems. More advanced automation in nuclear early warning systems could allow 
greater situational awareness, reducing the risk of false alarms. It could also play a valuable role 
in helping human decision-makers process large amounts of information quickly. In this regard, 
automated data processing may play a critical role in helping human nuclear early warning 
operators to identify threats – and false cues – in an increasingly data-saturated and complex 
strategic environment. Increased automation in NC2 could also help to reduce the risk of 
accidents or unauthorized use. And an expanded role for automation in communications could 
help ensure that command-and-control signals reach their targets quickly and uncorrupted in 
highly contested electromagnetic environments.  
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Automation could also be used to enhance defenses – physical or cyber – against attacks on 
nuclear early warning, command-and-control, delivery, and support systems, thereby enhancing 
deterrence and fortifying stability. It could also be used to bolster the resilience of vulnerable 
NC2 networks. For instance, long-endurance uninhabited aircraft that act as pseudo-satellites 
(“pseudo-lites”) to create an airborne communications network could increase NC2 resilience by 
providing additional redundant communications pathways in the event of satellite disruption. 
Automation could even enable autonomously self-healing networks – in physical or cyberspace – 
in response to jamming or kinetic attacks against command-and-control nodes, thereby 
sustaining situational awareness and command and control and enhancing deterrence. 
 
Many of these ways that autonomous systems could increase the resiliency and accuracy of NC2 
are speculative, however. Existing automation, as the Petrov incident shows, already creates the 
risk of automation bias. Knowledge of this will probably make most nuclear-armed states 
unlikely to further automate the early warning or command-and-control processes, with two 
exceptions: first, in situations where human-machine teaming might be further integrated to 
mitigate potential false alarms; second, in situations where a state fears for its secure second 
strike, and believes that further automation would reinforce deterrence of a potential aggressor. It 
is also possible, though less likely, that more automation could occur via a highly risk-tolerant 
nuclear-armed state that believes automated NC2 protocols would improve its ability to manage 
escalation.  
 
Strategic Decision Support Systems 
 
Strategic decision support systems could also affect nuclear stability by influencing how 
policymakers perceive and react to nuclear or strategic non-nuclear threats. States have long 
relied on computational methods to better understand threat environments and design solutions to 
emerging or imminent national security problems. During the Cold War, for instance, the 
Kremlin tasked the KBG with developing a computer program named “VRYAN” (the Soviet 
acronym for “Surprise Nuclear Missile Attack”) that would track the U.S.-USSR correlation of 
forces and notify Soviet leaders when a preemptive nuclear strike would be required to prevent 
the United States from achieving decisive military superiority.60 
 
VRYAN’s role in providing strategic warning was tested during the Soviet “war scare.” As early 
as the late 1970s, Soviet leaders were increasingly concerned that the United States had 
abandoned détente and had instead committed itself to achieving decisive military superiority. 
These fears climaxed in 1983 during NATO’s annual command post exercise – codename “Able 
Archer 83” – with Moscow allegedly placing forces on higher readiness out of fear that the 
exercise was in fact the start of U.S. nuclear preemption.61 
 
VRYAN’s assessments fueled the Soviet leaders’ concerns, however. The data used to feed the 
system was often prejudiced, as intelligence officers tended to submit information that 
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conformed to the leadership’s view that the United States was pursuing first-strike superiority.62 
VRYAN’s assessments therefore reinforced Soviet leaders’ fears about the United States, driving 
a feedback loop.63 This loop may have been exacerbated by Soviet leaders’ predominately 
engineering backgrounds, which may have predisposed them toward viewing the program’s 
quantitative analysis as more credible than alternatives – a precursor to automation bias.64 This 
feedback loop amplified and intensified those perceived threats, rather than providing Soviet 
leaders with a clearer understanding of U.S. intentions.  
 
States’ reliance on computational models today may be growing due to the AI revolution. In 
2014, Russia erected the National Defense Control Center (NDCC) in Moscow. One of the 
NDCC’s primary functions is information fusion in support of conventional and nuclear 
operations.65 The Russian government is simultaneously investing heavily in AI, in part to better 
analyze the large quantities of data being delivered to NDCC and other agencies.66 As in the 
1980s, these investments are occurring at a time when Russian leaders see their nation as 
increasingly insecure due to the U.S. pursuit of military advantage, and the Russian military is 
more seriously evaluating the strategic merits of preemptive strike operations.67 
 
China is similarly investing in AI-enabled decision support systems. As Lora Saalman writes, 
Chinese officials fear that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be unable to detect and 
counter a low-signature, prompt “bolt-from-the-blue” attack on its nuclear forces.68 This fear 
reflects a combination of the perceived inadequacy of Chinese early warning systems and 
advances in U.S. prompt strike capabilities. The threat of a successful disarming attack on 
Chinese nuclear forces has led Chinese officials to prioritize avoiding “false negatives” over 
“false positives.”69 That is, whereas U.S. officials are concerned firstly by the potential for a 
“false positive” – whereby early warning systems show incorrectly that an attack is underway – 
their Chinese counterparts are more concerned by the possibility that early warning systems will 
show that an attack is not underway, when in fact it is.  
 
China is investing heavily in AI-enabled decision support systems in part to help avoid false 
negatives by accelerating troops’ ability to identify and respond to a disarming attack.70 
Officials’ strong public emphasis on AI-supported decision-making as a potentially decisive 
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innovation suggests that they may be prone to automation bias.71 Chinese military-theoretical 
writing on information dominance and the notion of victory through scientific planning, each of 
which will rely on AI, according to researchers in China, also may make Chinese officials 
potentially susceptible to automation bias.72 
 
Decision support systems are not inherently destabilizing. However, if states comes to over rely 
on these systems for strategic decision-making, this could undermine nuclear stability. This risk 
may grow, especially if decision-makers and their advisors believe that AI could serve as a 
panacea for the myriad informational problems (e.g. incomplete data or inadequate analysis) that 
have stymied their efforts at national defense over the years.  
 
Moreover, AI-based decision-support systems may fail to deliver accurate information to 
decisionmakers precisely at the moment they are needed: in a crisis. Automated decision-support 
systems, whether rule-based or using machine learning, are only as good as the data they rely on. 
Building an automated decision-support tool to provide early warning of a preemptive nuclear 
attack is an inherently challenging problem because there is zero actual data of what would 
constitute reliable indicators of an imminent preemptive nuclear attack . This is most acutely 
challenging when trying to warn against a “bolt-from-the-blue.” Intelligence services can track 
indicators of large-scale military mobilization. But these indicators cannot provide insight into 
the minds of senior decision-makers, who may not have yet made a decision whether to attack. 
Indeed, a nation readying its nuclear forces to launch a preemptive attack might appear similar to 
one preparing itself to “launch under attack” in response to what it perceives as indications that 
its adversary is preparing a nuclear first-strike. 
 
Automation could be valuable in allowing intelligence agencies to scan large swaths of data 
quickly for anomalous behavior at a scale and speed that would not be possible with human 
analysts. This could be done through rule-based indicators where intelligence services set up the 
equivalent of automated alerts to warn when certain indicators are tripped. This signature-based 
approach is similar to how malware detection works today, where automation looks for known 
signatures of malicious software. Newer approaches using unsupervised machine learning can 
even assist in identifying anomalous activity when signatures are not yet known. These tools 
could be valuable in increasing the ability of intelligence services to track the digital footprint of 
military forces.  
 
However, compiling AI-based indicators into an assessment of the likelihood of a preemptive 
attack would be extremely difficult, as the 1983 Stanislav Petrov incident highlights. Humans 
can rely on a multitude of contextual factors to help interpret indicators and assess an adversary’s 
intent. Any rule-based system that attempted to make an assessment of the likelihood of an attack 
based on pre-specified indicators would be limited by the fact that human analysts who write the 
rules may not themselves know precisely what the actual indicators would be of a preemptive 
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nuclear attack. Machine learning-based systems would similarly lack sufficient data to learn the 
signatures of a preemptive attack and could, at best, only indicate that some behavior was outside 
the norm.  
 
Even simple alert systems can be problematic if the manner in which they convey information is 
overconfident about the interpretation of that data and encourages automation bias, such as the 
Soviet early warning system communicating to Petrov “launch” and “missile strike.”73 
Automated systems that more directly conveyed the information actually measured (in that 
instance, “flash”) would decrease the risk of automation bias, by being more transparent to the 
human user. This tradeoff comes at a cost, however, as the human must take an additional step to 
interpret the data.  
 
Governments thus face tradeoffs not only in whether or not to use automated decision-support 
tools, but in how that information is conveyed to human leaders. Automated decision support 
tools could be stabilizing if they help decision-makers gain better insights adversary’s 
operations. This could help reassure leaders that an adversary is not planning an attack and could 
help make surprise attacks less feasible, reducing the incentives for preemption. On the other 
hand, false positives and automation bias could cause leaders to overreact to innocuous or 
ambiguous information, increasing instability. A major factor in how leaders calibrate such 
systems is likely to be their risk tolerance for false positives vs. false negatives. The more secure 
a country’s second strike capabilities, the less likely it may be to take excessive risk with 
automating command and control, because the consequences of a false negative would be 
relatively lower. A country confident in its ability to retaliate in response to a first strike should 
be, on average, more likely to calibrate in ways that do not over rely on autonomous systems.  
 
These risks of using automated decision-support systems are compounded by the fact that leaders 
won’t have sufficient data about the systems’ performance in a crisis to calibrate their degree of 
trust in it. Even worse, the system may perform adequately in peacetime, causing leaders to be 
lulled into a false sense of security about the system’s reliability. Peacetime accuracy may cause 
leaders to place excessive faith in the systems’ abilities to accurately identify and recommend 
responses to emergent threats. In this case, over time, leaders could become lulled into a sense of 
security about the efficacy of the system, even though they would have little actual data to 
support its value in warning of preemptive nuclear attack. Similar human-machine interaction 
failures have occurred in other settings where seemingly flawless performance leads humans to 
overtrust in automation, as in several fatal crashes involve Tesla autopilots. If a state does come 
to over rely on AI-enabled decision support systems for strategic decision-making, then it may 
fall subject to many of the limitations demonstrated in the VRYAN case. For instance, biased 
instructions for data collection to feed AI-enabled decision support systems may drive feedback 
loops that reinforce preexisting fears and amplify international tensions, potentially to the point 
of nuclear escalation. The potential for such loops may be increased if leaders believe that AI 
cannot be biased, and so take less care to remove their own biases from the design and use of the 
systems.  
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Nuclear Launch Platforms and Delivery Vehicles 
 
The second potential area where autonomous systems could influence nuclear stability is through 
their use as nuclear launch platforms and delivery vehicles. “Nuclear launch platforms,” such as 
submarines, aircraft, missile launch facilities and associated control centers, or transporter 
erector launchers (TELs), are the systems that launch nuclear delivery vehicles. These platforms 
have historically been inhabited. The “nuclear delivery vehicle” is the bomb, missile, torpedo, or 
other mechanism that carries the nuclear warhead from launch to target. Nuclear delivery 
vehicles are not intended to be recoverable.74  
 
Nuclear-armed states have historically limited the role of automation in nuclear launch platforms 
so that humans retain positive control over nuclear targeting and strike initiation. Yet this might 
change in the coming decades. The United States is building a new bomber, the B-21 Raider, 
which will be nuclear-capable and reportedly will be “optionally manned.”75 While the United 
States has not specified whether the B-21 bomber would ever be operated remotely while 
carrying nuclear weapons, statements by Air Force officials suggest such a move would be very 
unlikely. The Air Force’s 2013 report, Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) Vector, briefly mentions 
the issue, stating “nuclear strike, may not be technically feasible unless safeguards are developed 
and even then may not be considered for [unmanned aircraft systems] operations.”76 Informally, 
U.S. Air Force general officers have been more vocal about their discomfort with the concept of 
uninhabited vehicles armed with nuclear weapons. In 2016, General Robin Rand, head of Air 
Force Global Strike Command, stated: “We're planning on [the B-21] being manned. … I like 
the man in the loop … very much, particularly as we do the dual-capable mission with nuclear 
weapons."77  
 
Other nations, however, may calculate the costs and benefits of using uninhabited nuclear launch 
platforms differently than the United States. For instance, states might choose to arm rapidly-
proliferating UAVs with nuclear weapons if they saw benefits to doing so.78 For example, in 
2012, reflecting Russia’s investments to overcome U.S. military superiority, a Russian Air Force 
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lieutenant general stated Russia could field an uninhabited nuclear bomber in the 2040s.79 One 
report suggests that North Korea may be considering using drones to disperse radioactive agents 
against the South Korean population in the case of a war.80 Russia has also reportedly developed 
a seabed launcher for the Status-6 nuclear delivery vehicle, which is discussed further below.81  
 
Many nuclear delivery vehicles already incorporate automation into certain aspects of their 
operations. For instance, once an ICBM or submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) is 
launched, the system relies on automation to maintain its flight trajectory and navigate by inertial 
or astro-inertial inputs to its assigned targets.82 Open sources indicate, however, that some states 
are considering expanding the role of automation in their nuclear delivery vehicles.  
 
For example, Russia is reportedly developing a “new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-
powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.”83 On March 1, 2018, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
confirmed the existence of an “unmanned underwater vehicle…that would carry massive nuclear 
ordnance.”84 He characterized the weapon, known as “Status-6” or “Poseidon,” as a response to 
U.S. investments in missile defenses, which Russian leaders fear could be used alongside long-
range non-nuclear precision strike weapons to neutralize Russia’s nuclear deterrent.85 Putin went 
on to say that Status-6 is designed for use against aircraft carrier groups or coastal targets, and 
that it would rely on speed, depth, maneuverability, and quietness to reach its target.86 The 
Russian government has said little about the role of AI in Status-6, but a Russian source suggests 
that the Status-6 might be able to use AI to evade enemy anti-submarine warfare (ASW) forces 
on the way to its target.87  
 
A Boon to Escalation Management?  
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Uninhabited nuclear launch platforms may be seen to offer some strategic benefits to nuclear-
armed states. Nuclear-armed UAVs, for instance, could be kept aloft for far longer than is 
possible with human pilots, decreasing fear of a disarming first strike. B-2 bomber pilots, for 
instance, have flown a maximum of 40-hour missions.88 By contrast, refuelable UAVs could stay 
aloft for several days, limited only by engine lubricants and other reliability factors. Uninhabited 
aircraft have already conducted 80-hour flights.89 The maximum endurance record for a 
refuelable aircraft is 64 days.90  
 
The ability to keep nuclear bombers in the air for longer periods of time might offer 
policymakers new tools for managing escalation. Long-endurance nuclear-armed UAVs could 
provide policymakers with additional options for nuclear signaling, since they could be kept on-
station longer than would otherwise be possible. Likewise, if they are sufficiently survivable 
against adversary countermeasures, nuclear-armed UAVs might improve a state’s ability to 
deliver nuclear weapons in a timely manner since they could be kept aloft closer to potential 
targets longer than their manned counterparts. For some less powerful nuclear-armed states, 
UAVs may also be seen as a lower-cost, longer-range alternative to human-inhabited nuclear 
bombers. Lower-cost systems are unlikely to be as survivable as their more expensive 
counterparts, however, thus limiting their utility.  
 
Nuclear delivery vehicles that leverage AI for certain functions may also be seen to provide 
strategic benefits. For instance, the Status-6’s notional AI-enabled counter-ASW capabilities 
may help to improve Russian leaders’ confidence in their secure second strike regardless of 
advances in U.S. missile defenses by convincing them that their nuclear-armed torpedoes will 
always be able to reach their targets. This might constitute an improvement to U.S.-Russian 
nuclear stability.91 But any such reassurance will be limited by the fact that, while torpedoes may 
pose a threat to coastal targets, they cannot strike inland strategic targets, such as enemy 
leadership redoubts, command centers, strategic forces, critical infrastructure, or population 
centers.92 As a result, even if automation does improve Status-6 survivability, it would constitute 
only a marginal improvement to the overall viability of Russia’s nuclear deterrent, since from 
Moscow’s perspective, U.S. missile defenses and strike capabilities could still prevent it from 
using missiles to hold the full range of necessary targets at risk.93  
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The Status-6 would be similarly constrained as a limited nuclear option for use against land 
targets, thereby further minimizing its likely impact on nuclear stability. If the weapon actually 
carries a “massive nuclear ordnance,” as Putin said, then it is unlikely to be used against a land 
target during a limited nuclear war. That is, so long as the nuclear first-user’s objective was to 
impel a de-escalation of hostilities – a logic evident in Russian thinking94 – then using a high-
yield area-devastation weapon would likely be seen as counterproductive, since it is more likely 
to invite reciprocal escalation. If the Status-6 warhead’s yield were lower, Russian leaders might 
view the delivery vehicle’s AI-enabled counter-ASW capabilities as helping to ensure their 
ability to execute limited nuclear strikes on the U.S. homeland. Even if true, however, the 
weapon would still only be able to reach coastal targets. Furthermore, if a Status-6 target was a 
population center, critical infrastructure, or a major military facility – or if the collateral effects 
of a Status-6 attack rose above some threshold – then the U.S. would be less likely to perceive 
the attack as being limited and might respond accordingly. Therefore, while the weapon might 
help to reassure Russian leaders of their ability hold the U.S. homeland at risk of limited nuclear 
strike, any confidence gained – and any consequent effects on nuclear stability – is likely to be 
marginal.  
 
The Kremlin might view Status-6 as more significantly enhancing its ability to use limited 
nuclear force at sea. If Russian leaders believe that Status-6’s notional AI-enabled counter-ASW 
capabilities improve their ability to hold naval targets at risk of nuclear strike, then they might be 
more inclined to consider or execute such a strike during a crisis or conflict. Yet, whether that 
would be stabilizing or not would be highly contingent on the circumstances. For instance, were 
Russian leaders to credibly communicate that inclination to their Western adversaries, fear of 
Russian nuclear use at sea might impel restraint on the latter’s part, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of further escalation in a crisis or conflict. Alternatively, Washington and its allies 
might rededicate themselves to denying Russian leaders’ any confidence in their ability to use 
nuclear force to impel war termination on terms favorable to them, for instance, by promising a 
like response should Russia cross the nuclear threshold. In that case, by providing Russian 
leaders with a new tool for nuclear brinksmanship, the Status-6 might contribute to a scenario 
where reciprocal nuclear escalation is suddenly more plausible.  
 
Escalation Risks 
 
Uninhabited nuclear launch platforms would pose challenges for maintaining nuclear surety, or 
positive human control, over nuclear weapons. Recoverable uninhabited platforms differ 
fundamentally from missiles because the former can be sent on patrol. With uninhabited launch 
platforms sent on patrol, policymakers would have effectively delegated the decision to start 
nuclear war to some combination of the system’s remote communications links to human 
operators and onboard automation. There would be no human onboard to have physical control 
over the nuclear weapons, thereby degrading surety. While militaries could employ encrypted 
communications links and fail-safe measures such as automation directing the platform to return 
home in the event of a communications failure, these measures cannot always guarantee effective 
control. In 2011, for instance, a U.S. RQ-170 stealth drone crashed in Iran, landing sensitive 
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technology in the hands of the Iranian government.95 At worst, loss of control of an uninhabited 
nuclear launch platform due to technical malfunction or an unanticipated environmental 
interaction could set the stage for accidental escalation, setting nations on the path to nuclear 
escalation.96 Short of that, it could lead to loss of nuclear weapons, loss of sensitive technologies, 
and a diplomatic crisis. 
  
Not only could a state potentially lose control of a system, the system would also be vulnerable 
to hacking. While digital systems are vulnerable to hacking regardless of whether there is a 
person onboard, uninhabited systems raise unique cyber security challenges. Without a person 
onboard who has physical access to the system and could disable it or employ hardware-level 
cutouts to critical systems, an adversary could potentially take control of an uninhabited vehicle. 
Intrusions could occur via communications links, but even “off network” systems are vulnerable 
to hacking.97 An adversary could gain physical access to the system or implant malware via 
ground maintenance software.98 Severing a vehicle’s communications links and making it fully 
autonomous would reduce some avenues for intrusion, but not eliminate them entirely, and 
would come at the cost of losing the ability to recall the system.99 While less likely, in the worst 
case, hacking uninhabited nuclear launch platforms raises the potential for catalytic escalation, 
whereby a third-party actor hacks a state’s military system and uses it to attack another country, 
thereby triggering escalation between the targeted states.  
 
Many of the same risks would be present in nuclear delivery vehicles that leveraged AI but relied 
on external communications or other inputs for mission execution. For instance, once Status-6 is 
deployed, if it is capable of receiving instructions from remote operators, then it may also be 
more vulnerable to technical malfunction, unanticipated environmental interactions, or third-
party interference, each creating new risk of accidental or catalytic escalation. 
 
A nuclear delivery vehicle that could autonomously select its target would introduce additional 
risks. Even if a human deliberately launched a nuclear strike, if the weapon hit the wrong target 
it could unintentionally escalate a conflict or even hit a target in a third country. There is 
currently no evidence to suggest that Status-6 is capable of autonomous target selection.  
 
Status-6 could also threaten nuclear stability for reasons driven less by automation than by other 
aspects of its design or use. One reason is that its lengthy transit time could complicate war 
termination efforts. That is, assuming Status-6 maintains its reported top speed of 70 knots and 
takes the most direct route, it would take it over a day and a half to reach New York from the 
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Denmark Strait. That transit time increases to over two days if it is launched from the Barents 
Sea.100 If the weapon is not recallable, then once it is launched, the Russian government’s ability 
to negotiation war termination will be seriously limited by the fact that a nuclear strike is already 
en route to the U.S. homeland even as they are seeking off-ramps. This risk would be mitigated 
somewhat if the weapon were launched closer to American shores – and coastal defenses. But 
even if it were launched from near Bermuda, for example, it would still take over 10 hours to 
arrive – a not-insignificant amount of time in the midst of a nuclear war.101 This risk could also 
be mitigated if Status-6 is recallable. But recallability – like any technical function – may be 
vulnerable to failure. That vulnerability is accentuated by the fact that radio communications are 
difficult underwater.102 Furthermore, if the system is recallable, this might create new 
operational risks due to unanticipated environmental interactions or hacking.  
 
Thus, the area of uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms and more highly-automated nuclear 
delivery vehicles seems like a critical one – especially given the potential for accidents and 
miscalculation described above. Even though the United States prioritizes nuclear surety, and is 
therefore unlikely to deploy uninhabited nuclear delivery platforms, other nations may not show 
similar reticence. The same can be said for nuclear delivery vehicles featuring higher levels of 
automation.  
 
Conventional Military Applications of Autonomous Systems 
 
Autonomous systems could also affect nuclear stability through their conventional military 
applications. Among major powers, the Third Offset strategy launched by the Department of 
Defense during the Obama administration highlights the way the United States military believes 
that autonomous systems could influence the future of conventional warfare.103 Translated 
Chinese military and industry documents, for example, demonstrate intense research and 
development by China regarding the deployment of autonomous combat systems in the air and in 
other domains.104 The Russian Federation is similarly investing in military robotics in order to 
strengthen its conventional deterrent against NATO or other foes. Moreover, states are likely to 
be more willing to accept increased autonomy in conventional systems than nuclear ones, 
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allowing potentially greater opportunities for these applications.105 Nevertheless, some 
conventional applications of automation could possibly affect nuclear stability in significant 
ways that are both direct and indirect. 
 
Counterforce Operations 
 
Direct uses of autonomous systems for the nuclear mission intersects with ongoing debates about 
how technological change is influencing nuclear survivability. Daryl Press and Keir Lieber argue 
that changes in accuracy and transparency are decreasing arsenal survivability in ways that are 
increasing the potential for counterforce strikes.106 They state that robotics and AI could allow 
for real time tracking of adversary nuclear arsenals and rapid, accurate strikes in ways that make 
counterforce operations more plausible.  
 
However, there are several reasons to think that while specific applications of AI might improve 
the ability of countries to find and fix adversary nuclear arsenals in some contexts, this is 
unlikely to significantly change the potential for counterforce strikes. Their argument relies on 
two key assumptions. On accuracy, they presume that a nuclear war will occur in a world where 
countries have full access to their targeting sensors and data – and where those sensors and any 
resulting data, in turn, are not subject to adversary countermeasures. This presumes more of a 
bolt from the blue event than an escalation of a conventional conflict. On transparency, they 
presume that 24 minute-interval satellite passes over roadways, in combination with longer-range 
aerial surveillance from UAVs and other assets, would provide enough information to generate 
real-time tracking against mobile Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL) units employing deception 
and concealment. In principle, if this capability were robust, it could decrease states’ confidence 
in the survivability of their mobile ICBMs, undermining deterrence.107 Thus, a conventional 
application of AI, in the ISR collection and processing arena, could have strategic 
consequences.108 
 
Key hurdles, however, are achieving the scale and robustness needed to find, fix, and track not 
just one target but all of a country’s mobile nuclear systems, as well as the timeline for doing so. 
In order to be relevant, the information must be collected and processed with high fidelity, at 
scale, and in a timely enough fashion to shape nuclear strike decisions.  Machine learning 
algorithms, particularly those trained on huge datasets of past surveillance data, could potentially 
increase the speed of processing data on adversary nuclear locations. It is far from clear, 
however, that the application of AI would provide enough of an improvement in transparency to 
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change how countries think about whether to use nuclear weapons. As Miller, Fontaine, and 
Velez-Green write, “[I]t is one thing to locate a system, for instance in the middle of the Atlantic 
Ocean or the Siberian forest. It is another thing to be able to deliver a sufficiently destructive and 
accurate weapon against the targeted system before it is able to fire or conceal itself.”109 The 
destructive power of nuclear weapons means that even one missed weapon could wipe out a city. 
Even a low probability that a single weapon might survive a first strike and be used in a 
retaliatory strike could be enough to deter the attempt. Nevertheless, perceptions matter, and if a 
state perceived its arsenal to be vulnerable, that may change state behavior in a crisis. 
 
Some argue that networks of UUVs, USVs, and UAVs could dramatically improve states’ 
abilities to hold strategic missile-armed nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs) at risk, 
threatening the latter’s deterrent credibility.110 However, similarly the complexity of the ASW 
mission – the steps that must be taken for ASW forces to detect, classify, localize, and engage a 
single SSBN, much les an entire fleet of SSBNs – means these risks also are likely overstated. 
Generally, to hold an SSBN at risk, ASW forces must persistently maintain sensors where they 
believe that submarine is likely to operate, share sensor and other data in a timely manner to 
coordinate to maintain optimal coverage, cue and direct searches, and confidently classify an 
underwater contact as an SSBN. Once ASW forces localize an SSBN, they must maintain 
localization until an ASW weapons-carrying platform is guided to attack range of the SSBN and 
consummates an engagement. Depending on the situation, this process can take hours or even 
days.111 
 
Claims that AI could generate a “transparent ocean”112 or “selective ocean transparency”113 
likely overstate the ability of low-cost UUVs, USVs, and UAVs to conduct these steps. First, in 
order to be low-cost, uninhabited vehicles are generally of limited size, weight, and power 
(SWaP) capacity, at least relative to traditional attack submarines. These facts, combined with 
the inherent physics-based difficulties of sensing in the undersea environment,114 mean that the 
sensors carried by any given low-cost UUV, USV, or UAV will be of limited detection range 
regardless of the phenomenologies they employ.115 Given the sensors’ limited range, ASW 
forces would need to deploy large numbers of sensor vehicles to seamlessly cover even small 
oceanic areas.116 UUVs in particular are limited in endurance, because of their need to rely on 
air-independent power sources such as batteries or fuel cells. This means that additional UUVs 
would be needed to sustain a track on a submarine over time, as UUVs reach the end of the their 
                                                 
109 James N. Miller, Jr., Richard Fontaine, and Alexander Velez-Green, “Averting the U.S.-Russia Warpath,” The 
National Interest, March/April 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/averting-the-us-russia-warpath-24604.   
110 Lieber and Press, "The New Era of Counterforce”. For more discussion, see Gates, “Is the SSBN Deterrent 
Vulnerable to Autonomous Drones?” 
111 For more on ASW, see Owen R. Cote Jr., The Third Battle: Innovation in The Navy’s Silent Cold War Struggle   
With Soviet Submarines (Newport, RI: US Naval War College Press, 2003). 
112 David Hambling, “The Inescapable Net: Unmanned Systems in Anti-Submarine Warfare,” Briefing No. 1, 
Parliamentary Briefings on Trident Renewal (BASIC, March 2016). 
113 Sebastian Brixey-Williams, “Will the Atlantic become transparent?” Third Edition (British Pugwash, 2018). 
114 Rear Admiral Charles Richard, “The Mirage of Transparent Ocean,” Navy Live, July 29, 2016, 
https://navylive.dodlive.mil/2016/07/29/the-mirage-of-a-transparent-ocean/.  
115 Jonathan Gates, “Is the SSBN Deterrent Vulnerable to Autonomous Drones?” The RUSI Journal, 161 no. 6 
(2016), 29-33; and Ian Keddie, “Trident at Risk? UMV Technology vs Submarine Stealth,” CABLE Magazine 
(2017). 
116 Rear Admiral John Gower, “Concerning SSBN Vulnerability” (BASIC, June 2016). 
Page 27 of 35 
operational endurance and need to return to base. (Ultra-long endurance UUV power solutions, 
such as thermal gliders that draw energy from ocean thermoclines, lack sufficient speed and 
power to maintain track on a submarine.117) While fleets of UUVs, USVs, and UAVs are likely 
to have cost-savings relative to traditional assets and will be valuable supplements in a “high-low 
mix” of ASW capabilities, the scale of assets needed to render even a portion of the ocean 
“transparent” would likely be enormous. Setting cost and practicality aside, ASW forces would 
also have to keep these sensors appropriately positioned to maintain high-confidence area 
surveillance and target tracking. This would require a level of multi-system control reliability 
and resilience not yet demonstrated.118  
 
Fewer sensors would be required to monitor ocean chokepoints. But only Chinese and British 
SSBNs must pass through chokepoints to hold their primary targets at risk – and both countries 
have offset this risk. Although Chinese SSBNs would need to pass through chokepoints in the 
First Island Chain to cover the entire United States, China’s land-based mobile ICBM force can 
cover targets at that range. Likewise, British SSBNs must pass through chokepoints to the north 
or south of Ireland to reach deep waters. But, as British Rear Admiral John Gower has written, 
monitoring those chokepoints would probably still require a high number of sensors.119 And the 
costs of maintaining or cycling those systems would still be high. Furthermore – and crucially – 
any UUVs, USVs, or UAVs deployed in the chokepoints would be subject to countermeasures 
employed on an adaptive basis, including improved stealth, jamming, multi-phenomenology 
decoys and spoofing, evasive maneuvers, or outright destruction by SSBN protection forces.120 
Many of the same countermeasures could also be used against sensors operating in the open 
ocean.  
 
Even if ASW forces were able to maintain optimal sensor coverage in the search area, they 
would then face problems of data transmission that automation is ill suited to solve. The UUVs, 
USVs, and UAVs sent to monitor the open ocean or a chokepoint must be able to share data – 
processed or raw – amongst themselves – directly or through command nodes – in a timely 
manner in order to maintain coverage, cue and direct searches, confidently classify a contact as 
an SSBN, and then support weapons employment against the SSBN. In order to be used 
effectively, any vehicle that attains a track on an SSBN would need to be able to transmit that 
data to another vehicle.121  
 
While highly automated network management technologies may be able to enhance 
communications resilience between uninhabited – or uninhabited and inhabited – ASW 
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platforms,122 such data transmission will remain a vulnerability for any undersea 
communications.123 It bears noting that the physics of undersea communications results in fairly 
short range communications paths at low data rates. Longer range communications paths and 
higher data rates forces reliance on surface or airborne communications relays that are vulnerable 
to jamming or other interference. Even temporary or partial delays in data transmission could 
undermine ASW forces’ abilities to localize an SSBN – and given that the window of 
opportunity to localize a submarine may be very short, an inopportune communications delay or 
disruption may make the difference between ASW success and failure.124  
 
Finally, if we assume that ASW forces relying on UUVs, USVs, and UAVs were able to 
confidently classify and localize an SSBN in their search area, they would need to maintain 
localization long enough for an ASW weapons-carrying platform to close within attack range of 
the SSBN and successfully engage it. If a weapons-carrying platform is located close by, for 
instance, near a chokepoint through which a SSBN is transiting and where that SSBN’s 
protection forces are unable provide effective coverage – again, an implausible scenario for 
reasons of both geography and nuclear force structure for all nuclear-armed states – this may be a 
relatively easy problem to solve. However, if the search is occurring in the open ocean, the sheer 
expanse of that area suggests that a weapons-carrying platform is unlikely to be within 
immediately-actionable proximity of the SSBN when confident classification is made.125  
 
Automated protocols might reduce the time required to signal and dispatch an ASW weapons-
carrying platform. But the weapons-carrying platform’s transit time alone would leave a window 
for the SSBN’s crew to conduct countermeasures—or for inherently dynamic underwater 
conditions to degrade the ability of the sensors in contact to maintain track. This time window 
could be reduced by arming uninhabited vehicles directly. Nevertheless, the problems of 
coordinating multiple vehicles, at scale, for an extended period of time, and robustly in a 
challenging communications environment amidst adversary countermeasures remains. 
 
If ASW forces miss any of these steps, then they will be unable to detect, classify, localize, and 
engage the SSBN. To successfully prosecute a disarming first strike against a nation’s entire 
SSBN fleet, an opposing nation’s ASW forces would need to execute the entire kill chain for 
every one of those boats – and probably near-simultaneously to avoid triggering fleet-wide 
countermeasures (which would render subsequent ASW operations even more difficult) or 
strategic escalation.126 
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There might also be other ways states could leverage increased automation, autonomy, and 
artificial intelligence for counter-nuclear operations as well. These could include enhanced 
missile defenses, improving the accuracy of conventional or nuclear counterforce strike options, 
or boosting the efficacy of offensive cyber-attacks against enemy nuclear command-and-control 
systems. Like the ASW argument, it is entirely possible that many of these concepts, while 
theoretically possible, are not realistic or feasible given the state of technology today or on the 
near-horizon. Even if these capabilities do not materialize, however, the current rapid pace of 
technological advancement may increase the risk of misperception. If a nuclear-armed state’s 
leadership comes to believe that military automation has or may soon have the ability to 
undermine its nuclear deterrent – whether that is correct or not – it may take destabilizing 
hedging measures, such as heightening alert statuses or delegating nuclear launch authority.  
 
Speed in Conventional War  
 
In addition, autonomous systems could compress decision cycles in conventional warfare. As 
former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert O. Work has said, algorithms will be able to 
make decisions faster than humans, propelling the pace of armed conflict to “machine speed.”127 
States may react to these shifts in dangerous ways. For instance, if a nuclear-armed state fears 
that its adversary might launch a disarming attack on its nuclear forces before it can respond, 
then it might further automate nuclear launch processes, put its nuclear arsenals on heightened 
alert, or pre-delegate more authority to field commanders. It might also endorse a doctrine of 
preemption, so as to get ahead of an adversary disarming attack.128 These moves, designed to 
deter, defeat, or preempt a disarming strike and give their country the ability to strike back in the 
face of conventional defeat, might lead one side to use nuclear weapons first. And, in the event 
of accidents or intentional misuse, automation could shorten the steps needed for an incident to 
escalate. 
 
The potential for nuclear escalation in a conventional conflict with autonomous systems is 
compounded by the way that autonomous systems could enable adopters to fight faster than 
those operating non-autonomous systems do at present. Because of machines’ superior reaction 
times, autonomous systems would have a speed-based edge in decision-making over human-
controlled systems. This could have immediate tactical advantages. An autonomous plane might 
be more adept at identifying and avoiding air defense threats, for example, or better at predicting 
and defeating adversaries in an air-to-air engagement, making it more able to complete its 
mission. The cumulative effect of this faster decision-making could also translate into a faster 
tempo at the operational level of war. A military force that is heavily invested in AI could 
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essentially enable faster operations by autonomous systems relative to remotely-piloted or 
inhabited systems. Some Chinese scholars have hypothesized that this trend could result in a 
“battlefield singularity,” in which the pace of action on the battlefield eclipses the speed of 
human decision-making.129  
 
Fear of losing quickly could create incentives for more rapid escalation to the nuclear level. To 
the extent that reasoned, sustained thinking makes countries more likely to back away from the 
nuclear brink, autonomous systems, and especially autonomous weapon systems, could 
undermine the security of time. The fear of losing – or falling behind the pace of battle and 
losing the ability to even identify when a loss is imminent – could lead countries to take drastic 
measures in response. If leaders perceived regime security or nuclear command-and-control were 
at risk, such time-sensitive pressure could incentivize preemptive escalation or, in the worse 
cases, nuclear first-use.130 
 
It is also possible, however, that autonomous systems could help countries buy time in ways that 
make nuclear escalation less likely. The United States and its competitors already deploy 
expansive sensor networks, stretching from outer space to cyberspace. But the amount of data 
produced by these sensing arrays threatens to overwhelm human operators today. The emergence 
of highly-automated data processors could change that, allowing national decision-makers to 
make far better sense of the cluttered battlespace. In fact, the first use of “AI” technology at the 
U.S. Department of Defense was for automated information processing to help monitor full-
motion video drone feeds through Project Maven.131 Greater awareness and understanding of an 
adversary’s actions could reduce the risk of miscalculation. Leaders would be able to replace 
uncertainty – and a fear of the worst – with near real-time information on an adversary’s forces. 
Greater visibility could reassure leaders that a surprise attack was not underway, and the 
knowledge of this visibility would reduce incentives for a surprise attack. More advanced 
automation and autonomous systems could also help to improve the security, efficiency, and 
resiliency of military communications and command-and-control systems, which are subject to 
increased disruption in the cyber, electromagnetic, and physical domains. This greater resilience 
could reduce the vulnerability of nuclear communications and command-and-control systems to 
disruption.  
 
Conventional Advantages and Nuclear Escalation 
 
Autonomous systems could also influence the potential for nuclear escalation indirectly from the 
potential for robotic and autonomous systems to give large conventional military advantages to 
their adopters. 
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For instance, the Eisenhower doctrine of massive retaliation sought to “knock out [the Soviet] 
SAC first” once major war appeared imminent, thereby enabling the United States to use nuclear 
weapons to offset the Warsaw Pact’s numerical advantage in conventional forces.132 Some fear 
that Russia, now in a position of conventional inferiority relative to the United States, might 
escalate to nuclear war more quickly during a conflict for similar reasons.133 Concern about the 
way that U.S. conventional superiority might encourage nuclear-armed adversaries to escalate in 
a crisis led the U.S. Department of Defense, in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, to discuss 
U.S. nuclear deterrence as critical, in part, for “communicating to potential nuclear-armed 
adversaries that they cannot escalate their way out of failed conventional aggression.”134  
 
If a nation deploys autonomous systems in a manner that significantly tilts the conventional 
military relationship in its favor, a nuclear-armed adversary may feel increased incentives to 
resort to nuclear use, or the threat thereof, to avoid military defeat.135 For instance, the advent of 
autonomous swarming forces with greater speed and coordination than human-centered systems 
could heighten conventional military imbalances in key regions, such as Europe or Asia. This 
possibility has already attracted the attention of prominent Russian strategists, who write that 
robotic systems could one day “yield results comparable to the battlefield efficiency of nuclear 
weapons.”136 If autonomous military systems provide an actor like the United States – or others 
in the future – a decisive conventional military advantage versus a nuclear-armed adversary, that 
adversary may be incentivized to threaten or even use nuclear weapons to defeat aggression or 
coerce an end to the conflict. Russia is not the only country that has indicated a possible 
willingness to use limited nuclear strikes to end a conventional war that it is losing on favorable 
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terms. Pakistan has indicated likewise.137 And China may be considering a similar doctrinal 
innovation.138  
 
It is also possible, however, that robotics and autonomous systems narrow the gap between 
nuclear powers, decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons. Given that the key driver of robotics 
and AI technology is the commercial sector – and that robotic technologies to-date have rapidly 
diffused – AI could end up being more of a net leveler among actors from a balance of power 
perspective. More sophisticated actors would still have access to more capable military systems, 
but the relatively low barriers to entry for AI and autonomous systems compared to other 
military-specific technologies such as stealth or fighter jet engines, means that less capable actors 
would gain in relative power. If applications of AI serve to narrow conventional military gaps, 
the result could actually decrease the reliance that some nuclear powers place on nuclear 
weapons, because they would feel more capable of defending themselves conventionally. 
 
Unintentional Escalation 
 
The use of autonomous systems for conventional military operations also could increase the risk 
of accidental, inadvertent, or catalytic escalation at the conventional level, with implications for 
nuclear stability. For instance, if nations developed lethal autonomous weapons that could 
choose their own targets without a human in the loop, they could potentially be at risk for 
accidents, miscalculation, or unanticipated interactions with the environment or adversary 
systems. During a crisis, such unauthorized interactions could pose risks to escalation 
management.139  
 
A more direct and worrisome consequence would be accidents that led to unintended attacks 
against adversary nuclear or dual-use command-and-control systems. For instance, autonomous 
kinetic-strike systems might inadvertently hit elements of an enemy theater command-and-
control system that is linked to its strategic command-and-control system. Or, autonomous cyber 
capabilities – active defensive or offensive – might “stumble into” sensitive areas in an 
adversary’s strategic military networks during a crisis or conflict, thereby inciting escalation.140  
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Catalytic (third party) escalation at the conventional level also poses a risk for nuclear stability. 
A third party observing rising tensions between two of its own nuclear-armed adversaries may be 
incentivized to instigate a crisis or conflict, in the expectation that it would benefit by turning its 
adversaries on one another. Autonomous systems may offer a particularly viable option for these 
actors. For instance, if the two states are engaged in a limited conventional war, a third party 
could hack an autonomous system fielded by one of the parties and use it to expand the scope of 
the conflict, for instance, by targeting previously untargeted theater or strategic assets. The risk 
of catalytic escalation would be exacerbated by actors’ unfamiliarity with autonomous systems, 
the increased speed of military activity in an era of AI, and more traditional drivers of crisis 
escalation, to include imperfect information about an adversary’s intentions and capabilities. 
Third party actors may be able to exploit these crisis dynamics to preserve their anonymity. For 
instance, they could redirect targeting by an autonomous system during a period of intensified 
fighting. This could leave the targeted actor with very little time to evaluate the likely source or 
intent of escalated attacks on its theater or strategic assets, thereby increasing the likelihood of 
counter-escalation.  
 
Escalation in each of the scenarios described above would be driven, at least at first, by 
conventional systems. Unwanted escalation below the nuclear threshold, however, could still 
increase the risk of crises or conflicts getting out of hand by dragging nations further down the 
slippery slope from crisis to conflict or conventional conflict to nuclear war.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Automation is in many ways a double-edged sword. When used for predictable tasks or to 
respond to known events, automation can be a boon, increasing safety and reliability. Automated 
systems are often “brittle,” however. They can perform exceptionally well under known 
conditions, but when pushed outside the bounds of their operating environment, they can often 
fail badly. Moreover, as automated systems become more complex, it can be increasingly 
difficult for users and even designers to reliably predict when systems may fail.  
 
In spite of these risks, automation overall has tremendous potential advantages for improving 
safety and reliability in a variety of applications, including nuclear operations. Automated 
systems can execute routine tasks more precisely and reliably than humans and are not subject to 
fatigue or distraction. This is why automation is undoubtedly a major factor in improvements in 
airline safety.141 Self-driving cars likewise have tremendous potential to reduce automobile 
accidents, which kill over 30,000 people annually in the United States alone.142  
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Automation could thus complicate human decision-making in crises in surprising and perhaps 
counterintuitive ways. As Michael Carl Haas of ETH Zurich has argued, “[T]he artificial 
intelligence (AI) that governs the behavior of autonomous systems during their operational 
employment would become an additional actor participating in the crisis, though one who is 
tightly constrained by a set of algorithms and mission objectives.” 
 
A key factor mediating the interaction between autonomous systems and nuclear security will 
involve psychology – potentially the way automation bias and other cognitive biases could shape 
decision making.143 The same contradictions that pose challenges for nuclear stability overall 
remain present in decisions about whether or not to automate. A major factor in crises is not only 
how automation influences the user’s decision-making, but also how it affects the adversary’s 
calculus. In theory, automation could be used to enhance deterrence by effectively tying one’s 
hands, for instance, by communicating that any attack on a nation’s homeland defense systems 
would trigger nuclear escalation. Making such a threat credible will be difficult, however. 
 
The analysis in this paper demonstrates that it remains to be seen whether automation has a net 
positive or negative effect on nuclear stability, but the potential risks are large. Whether it does 
could depend on the specific application – both where it falls in the nuclear enterprise but also 
how it is implemented in terms of design, human-machine interfaces, training, and operator 
culture. Like many things relating to nuclear stability, the value or harm in automation might 
also appear differently when considered from the net perspective of both sides. How automation 
is perceived also matters. If policymakers view automation as unpredictable and unreliable and 
therefore its use induces caution, then countries might be less willing to engage in brinkmanship. 
On the other hand, if nations viewed automation as more safe and reliable than it actually was, 
then it could lead policymakers to underestimate the chances of accidents or miscalculation and 
take risks they do not understand. 
 
As in other military and civilian applications, greater automation is likely to creep its way into 
nuclear operations over time, especially as nations modernize their nuclear forces. Additionally, 
the increasing use of automation and autonomous systems in other aspects of military operations 
could affect nuclear stability. Many of these applications of automation could potentially 
enhance nuclear stability, but others could undermine it. In the worst cases, states may not fully 
understand the risks posed by automation leading them to misjudge adversaries’ responses or 
potentially even how their own forces might behave in a crisis. Concepts such as retaining a 
human “in the loop,” while well-intentioned, are not a panacea against accidents. Automation 
bias can pose insidious risks that do not manifest until an accident occurs. Future research should 
think through, in greater details, the nuclear escalation risks posed by AI and autonomous 
systems in order to anticipate these challenges and, when possible, take the necessary steps to 
avert them.  
 
Technology is not destiny. The rapid progress of AI and automation in the commercial sector 
opens up opportunities for militaries, but militaries have a choice about how they incorporate 
automation into their forces. Some forms of automation could increase reliability and surety in 
nuclear operations, strengthening stability, while other forms could increase accident risk or 
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create perverse incentives, undermining stability. As in other aspects of nuclear stability, second- 
and third-order consequences must be understood. Actions that appear beneficial can sometimes 
have counterintuitive consequences, especially when accounting for an adversary’s decision 
calculus. When modernizing nuclear arsenals, policymakers should aim to use automation to 
decrease the risk of accidents and false alarms and increase human control over nuclear 
operations.   
 
